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Lebowitz: Supreme Court's Legal Mind

THREE VARIATIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT'S LEGAL MIND
by
ALBERT LEBOWITZ

I. CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

James Madison was remarkable in his role as Father of the Constitution and
much of his achievement can be attributed to his ability to translate complicated,
messy questions into beautifully coherent and logical answers. Not the least of his
insights was his equation of Enlightenment Reason with Law and his consequent
heavy investment in a Supreme Court that would share in a veto power over
2
Congressional Acts.' It is interesting to speculate what his Council of Revision, if
not rejected,' would have made of United States history: how Justice Marshall or
Taney or Warren, a Justice Holmes or a Black, would have functioned on such a veto
power. The spectre of the "political thicket" would never have been raised since
the Justices would have been unabashedly political animals from the beginning. One
imagines them functioning, perhaps, as the Cabinet that rose through necessity rather
than Constitutional mandate, but with a vital difference. The President, since he
could not fire the Justices and since he could not veto Congressional acts without
them, would have to listen to them. More, he would have to seduce and cajole them
in much the same way as with Congress.
I wonder, forexample, of the fate of the Alien and Sedition Acts, orJefferson's
Embargos, or whether Polk or Wilson would have treated Mexico so cavalierly.
Madison held out high hopes for ajudicial veto power. "[T]he utility," he observed,
"of annexing the wisdom and weight of the Judiciary to the Executive seemed
incontestable" 4. Yet, the other Constitutional Convention delegates did not hesitate
to contest the proposition and repeatedly defeat it.5
Left to its own devices, the Supreme Court has managed on the whole to justify
Madison's faith in its "wisdom and weight". It has even managed to function, often
in the face of severe criticism both externally and internally, if not as a Council of
'J.D., Harvard University 1948; A.B., Washington Univ., St. Louis 1945. Of Counsel, Donald L.
Schlapprizzi, P.C. This article is a slightly abridged version of the introductory chapter in a work-in-progress
entitled The Invisible Counselors: The Casefor the American Legal Mind in the Presidency.
I I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 95, 106, 108, 110, 131, 138-39, 144 (M. Farrand
ed. 1911) [hereinafter FEDERAL CONvENTION). 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION at 73, 74, 77, 298.
2 Id.
- i FizOhAL CONVENTION at i07, i08-09, ij0, 131, 13U. 2 Federal Convention at 80-81.
4 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION at 139.
5
Supra, note 3.
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Revision, then as a significant monitor of the actions of both Congress and the
Presidency.
It is clear, too, that by relinquishing the political power of membership on a
Council of Revision, the Supreme Court Justices gained immeasurably in independence. This enabled them to conceive of themselves as guardians of wisdom, which
they have carefully and consistently denied. Going further, in a subtle, transvaluating master-stroke of seeming self-restraint, Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison,6 not only enunciated the Supreme Court's ultimate power over acts of the
President, 7 and over Congress,' but most importantly, rejected the possibility that
Congress had any ultimate power over the Supreme Court.9 The last word, that
immensely powerful rhetorical instrument, was preserved for the Supreme Court.
With their independence, the Justices emerged, not, as Madison imagined
them, a unified definition of reason but with diverging strains of legal mindedness
that, as they almost inevitably clashed with each other, developed that added strength
which emerges from dialectic. Madison's vision may have been too simple.
Constitutional theory is heavily concentrated in the area ofjudicial review, and
the three issues raised in Marbury v. Madison'° are still subjects of heated debate and
controversy. It is remarkable how topical this opinion remains.
When Justice Marshall branded as illegal Jefferson's suppression of Adams's
"mid-night appointments", he not only incurred Jefferson's undying hostility, but
he formulated the doctrine that not even the President was above the "law", which
translates into "judicial law". Much of constitutional theory concerns itself
predictably with the Supreme Court side of the President/Supreme Court relationship. Relying principally upon the Supreme Court's "diary" of opinions, analysts
debate the actual or appropriate or (usually the most crucial concern) justifiable
extent of judicial review of constitutional questions; occasionally in terms of its
exclusivity and more often in regard to the Court's self-restraint, actual and desired.
C. Herman Pritchett, in an analysis of the Rooseveltian courtpacking scheme,
inferentially concedes that Supreme Court power is self-regulating: "[The present
Court] has attempted, though not always successfully, to keep in mind its own
limitations as a policy-forming agency." " Joseph Tanenhaus' treatment of the
Truman seizure of the steel mills in 1952 once again deals with the self-imposed
6

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
,,[For President Jefferson] to withhold his [Marbury's] commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court
not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right." Id. at 162.
8 "[T]he constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it ...
It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is." Id. at 177.
9"If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared
their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be
appellate; the distribution ofjurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance." Id. at 174.
7

10Id. at 137.

11Pritchett, The President and the Supreme Court, 49 J. Pol. 80, 92 (1949).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss1/5
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restraints of the Supreme Court in limiting Presidential power, either delegated by
Congress or based on presidential prerogatives purportedly flowing directly from the
Constitution:

".

.

. the Court has made it a bit easier for itself in insisting that

extraordinary power be reserved strictly for extraordinary occasions." 2 Tanenhaus
argues that the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co.' 3 case ushered in a theory of
relativity, under which the Court, a thermometer, measures the degree of the
emergency evoking presidential prerogative action or Congress' delegation of
power to the President.' 4 Stephen L. Wasby, in an article concerned exclusively with
the courts' treatment of the presidency as an institution, makes the point that until the
Nixon litigation, judicial efforts to limit presidential action were generally limited
and ineffectual, and that while "President Nixon did fare poorly, and he was
restrained by the courts" the Court still exercises judicial self-restraint when
reviewing presidential actions, particularly in the foreign policy areas, and when
supported by Congress. 5 An interesting approach, but still one which considers the
actions of the Supreme Court in terms of its own imposed limits, is taken by P. Allan
Dionisopoulos, who claims that since the early 1950's, the Court has been much less
timid in imposing restraints on the President. Dionisopoulos poses a set of guidelines
in judging President/Supreme Court encounters which relate mainly to the Court's
assessment of the probability the President will obey the order, or, given a sufficient
time lag, won't have to.' 6 Robert Heineman surveys instances of presidential/
judicial confrontations and clings to a more judicially-restrained view than Dioni7
sopoulos, i.e. that the Supreme Court is "usually no match forpresidential power."'1
But as the instances imply (e.g. Roosevelt and the New Deal, Nixon and Watergate,
Truman and seizure of the steel mills), the germinal question is usually not the
imposition of presidential power over, or scorn by the President of, any effort by the
Supreme Court to restrain the presidency, but rather how far the Supreme Court
wishes to go, or feels it must go, in self-restraint.
The common central concern of more generalized constitutional theorists,
whether interpretivists or non-interpretivists, 8 is the justification of Supreme Court
power, admittedly undemocratic in a democratic society.' 9 John Hart Ely settles
upon "a representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review"; i.e. the Court should
confine itself to enjoining encroachments upon the democratic processes by which
Tanenhaus, The Supreme Court and Presidential Power, 307 Annals 113 (1956).

12

13343 U.S. 579 (1952).

Tanenhaus, supra note 12, at 106-13. But Cf. Pritchett, The President'sConstitutionalPosition,in THE

14

PRESIDENCY REAPPRAISED

14 (Thomas E. Cronin and Rexford G. Tugwell eds. 1977). Cf. L. FISHER,

THE

CONsrnu-noN BETwEEN FmENDs: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT AND THE LAW 253 (1978) (regarding the
relationship between Congress and the President).
IsWasby, The Presidency Before the Courts 6 CAP. U.L. REV. 35 (1976).
16Dionisopoulos, New Patternsin Judicial Controlof the Presidency: 1950's to 1970's, 10 AKRON L. REV.
11(1976).

11Heineman, The Presidentand the FederalCourts, in DIMENSIONS
Kearney ed. 1981).
" See J. ELY, DEMocRAcY AND DismusT: A THEORY
9See, e.g., Id. at 4-5.
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the majority rules. 20 However, in considering the "representation of minorities", he
is inevitably led back to the familiar Supreme Court role of substantively protecting
individual rights. 21 Michael J. Perry invites the Supreme Court Justices to stop being
closet guardians of wisdom and regard themselves as legitimate custodians of
America's moral vision. 22 And Raoul Berger, an interpretivist concentrating on the
intentions of the Constitutional and Fourteenth Amendment Framers, would require
the Justices to honor such intentions when considering Constitutional questions. 23 A
most interesting criticism of judicial power's base in legal formalism is that taken by
Morton J. Horwitz, one of the more interesting and thoughtful progenitors of the
Critical Legal Studies movement, 24 an exciting and provocative, if highly politicized
and deconstructive, re-examination of legal theory. Horwitz, concentrating on the
dominance of American law by mercantile and entrepreneurial groups in the early
19th century, maintains that the "paramount social condition that is necessary for
legal formalism to flourish in a society is for the powerful groups in that society to
have a great interest in disguising and suppressing the inevitably political and
redistributive functions of law. '2 5 Regarding ante-bellum America, Horwitz's
"powerful groups" were the "mercantile and entrepreneurial groups" who by a
"triumph of a contractarian ideology" were "enabled ...to broadly advance their
own interests through a transformed system of private law.' '26 While noting in
passing "the Bar's own separate and autonomous professional interest" in the rise
of legal formalism, 27 Horwitz unfortunately dwarfs this recognition by his overriding concern with "the successful culmination of efforts by mercantile and entrepreneurial interests.., to transform the law to serve their interests, leaving them to wish
for the first time to 'freeze' legal doctrine. ' 28 Horwitz's quarrel with legal
formalism and, inevitably, with the judiciary that embraced it, was that" [n]ot only
had the law come to establish legal doctrines that maintained the new distribution of
economic and political power, but, wherever it could, it actively promoted a legal
redistribution of wealth against the weakest groups in the society. The rise of legal
formalism can be fully correlated with the attainment of these substantive legal
changes.' '29 The interposition of common law, posited as the application of reason,
does indeed serve to disguise an essential proposition--the vesting of a portion of the
sovereign power in judges, compounded in American common law by the power of
judges to void legislative and executive acts.30
20Id. at 73-104.
21 Id. at 135-179.
22 M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTs (1982).
23 R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY:
2

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

(1977).

See, e.g., Roberto Mangabeira Unger, "The Critical Legal Studies Movement," 96 HARV. L. REV. (1983);
The Politics of Law: A ProgressiveCritique (D. Kairys ed. 1982); CriticalLegal Studies Symposium, 36
STAN. L. REV. (1984); Symposius on CriticalLegal Studies, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 691 (1985).
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 266 (1977).
25
26 M HORWITZ,

Id.at 211.
1d.at 258.
2
1Id.at 259.
27

29Id. at 254.

3 See Marbury,5 U.S. at 137.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss1/5
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That the Supreme Court has the power to review presidential and congressional actions without its own actions being reviewable by the other branches (except
by the drastic, unlikely method of impeachment last tried unsuccessfully with Justice
Chase in 1805 by Jefferson and his Congress) is generally conceded. The extent of
the Supreme Court's self-restraint would not otherwise be so ardently and obsessively debated throughout the legal community. This concern is not intended to
imply that it is not important to consider how such presidents as Jefferson, Jackson,
Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and Nixon, rather than Supreme Court Justices, have
regarded ultimate judicial review, usually after the fact and often too late to have
more than a wrist-slapping effect: ".... the law of the Constitution is what Lincoln

did in the crisis, not what the Court said later," observes Clinton Rossiter. 3' As
Rossiter points out regarding the president's role as commander-in-chief, the Court
certainly has backed off so far that its "self-restraint" virtually becomes a renunciation of its power to review. After a survey of such presidential actions as Lincoln's
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus during the Civil War and Franklin Roosevelt's executive order resulting in the evacuation of some 70,000 Japanese American
citizens to internment camps, Rossiter concludes:
Finally, the implications of this study for constitutional law in the
atomic age should be crystal clear. As in the past, so in the future,
President and Congress will fight our wars with little or no thought
about a reckoning with the Supreme Court.32
Unquestionably it is important to consider justifications for Supreme Court
sovereignty (or the lack of it), for taking the measure of Supreme Court self-restraint
(or the lack of it), but, ultimately, it may be of more value simply to acknowledge that
we have, and have had from the beginning, an undemocraticSupreme Court in place,
and that it has functioned effectively for two hundred years because of its inestimable
value to a democratic society as a stabilizing and corrective influence on the volatile
majority rule of Congress and the presidency. This recognition is blurred by such
historians as Robert V. Remini who, echoing the Jacksonian idolatry of an unfettered
"majority rule" and ignoring the histories of South American "republics" with
subservient judiciaries, continue to hyperbolize with considerable hostility the
"undemocratic" nature of the American judicial system: "By the middle of the
twentieth century the courts had assumed virtually unlimited power in practically all
areas of law, social behavior, politics, economics, and every other field.
What has developed--particularly since the Civil War--is unrestrained judicial
review, an 'imperial judiciary', so called." 33

32

1d. at 131.

33 R. REMI,

THE LEGACY OF ANDREW JACKSON: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY,INDIAN REMOVAL, AND SLAVERY

27

(1988).
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TRADITIONAL CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE

SUPREME COURT'S LEGAL MIND

The Court comes as close as possible to symbolizing for each generation the
intellectual power conceded to the original creators of the Constitution. Collectively
the Justices represent the exercise of reason as a dominant continuing impulse in
American public life. To the American people, they have never been supplanted by
the academicians as the guardians of American intellectuality, for they, like the
Founding Fathers, must not only think but must immediately translate thought into
actions affecting millions of lives. In short, they are idealized as not only intelligent
but wise because no other idea of them is tolerable. Their exercises of reason are not
erasable blackboard speculations.
A legal system has much the same tenacity as more primitive codes of totems
and taboos. Its difference, that it has been consciously and deliberately instituted,
is less important than its equal necessity of maintaining itself through employing
high priests whose word is the Law. The Law prevails only so long as the subject
population has faith in the power of someone in authority to treat each legal
pronouncement as revelation. This faith contains seeds of primitive awe at
superhuman qualities in the law-pronouncer. In the case of kings ruling by divine
right, their "greatness" is largely measured by the felt sense of their "righteousness", a tradition inherited by our presidents, while "great" Supreme Court Justices
are those regarded as supremely wise. Created by a document devoted to a rule of
reason (that to preserve a democratic society, the individual must be safeguarded
from the democratic rule of that society), the Supreme Court has wrapped the
parchment about itself and made both the parchment and itself sacrosanct, not by
34
muttering incantations but by issuing sober exercises in the art of reasoning.
Given this sanctity which has survived vicious attacks by presidents as diverse
as Thomas Jefferson35 and Franklin Roosevelt36 (intent on protecting their own
magical properties), Supreme Court Justices, unlike politically manipulated presidents, have been set free to explore the limits of their mental capabilities. It is evident
that internal divergent strains of formalism, rule-skepticism and lawyer-moralism
(hereafter to be defined) have, in various combinations, determined the Court's
directions virtually from its beginning. The legal mind cannot be viewed simply as
a logic-powered vessel moving along inexorably in a single, deep channel. From the
3 See, e.g., H. STEEL COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND 361-62 (1950).
See 12 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 357 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1903); THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS:
THE COMPLETE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND ABIGAIL AND JOHN ADAMS 423 (L. J. Cappon
ed. 1988); 11 T. JEFFERSON, THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 140, (P.L. Ford ed. 1904) [hereinafter
JEFFERSON], 12 JEFFERSON at 137, 177-78, 201-02].
6See W. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 1932-1940,232-36 (1963); S. ROSENMAN, WORKING WITH ROOSEVELT 144 (1952); 6 F.D. ROOSEVELT, THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
'FRANKLiN D. ROOSEVELT 363-67 (1941).
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outside looking in, the polemics have been characterized usually as one of two, rather
than as here three, extremes. Justices have been labelled radical or conservative,
political or apolitical, moral or amoral, interpretivist or non-interpretivist, strict or
liberal constructionist (of the Constitution, of presidential powers, of congressional
powers, of aggregated federal powers, of states' powers, of the Court's powers),
idealist or pragmatist, activist or passivist, protector of property rights or personal
rights, party man or political maverick, and so on.
The problem with most of these characteristics is they often become extremely
implausible when applied to the sweep of a given Justice's career on the Court. They
cloud rather than clarify any attempt at understanding the legal mind on the Supreme
Court. A contemporary liberal, for example, scorns the post-Civil War laissez-faire
formalist Justice Stephen J. Field for his "reactionary" economic theories, but must
nevertheless applaud him for Cummings v. Missouri.37 Field's majority opinion
voided a Missouri statute requiring an oath of allegiance to the Constitution before
a person could engage in such professions as the ministry:
...[In] the pursuit of happiness, all avocations, all honors, all positions,
are alike open to every one ...in the protection of these rights all are
38
equal before law.
And what is that same liberal to make of one of his favorites, another formalist,
Justice Hugo Black, when he wished to convict a Yale Medical School professor for
violating a Connecticut anti-birth control statute 39 or validated discriminatory treat4°
ment of Japanese Americans during World War II?

III. THE

SUPREME COURT'S THREE VARIATIONS:

RULE-SKEPTICISM,

LEGAL FORMALISM, AND LAWYER-MORALISM

The consistency with which moral, political, economic or social expectations
of a Justice's judicial behavior are frustrated leads to the conclusion that it is usually
not a Justice's faith but the way he thinks that resists fluctuation and shapes a
harmonious pattern of his career. His legal mind operates between polarities of
formalism and rule-skepticism (with, I suggest, an aberrant excursion into moralism
by a Justice Warren), distinctions developed lucidly by H. L. A. Hart in The Concept
of Law.4' Hart devotes considerable time to the concepts of formalism and ruleskepticism in legal thought. Regarding formalism he notes:
Different legal systems, or the same system at different times, may
7 1 U--.S.(4t

¥a11. . 27

(1867).

3 Id. at 321-22.
19Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). (Black, J. dissenting).
40Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
41H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126-27 (1961).
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either ignore or acknowledge more or less explicitly such a need for the
further exercise of choice in the application of general rules to particular
cases. The vice known to legal theory as formalism or conceptualism
consists in an attitude to verbally formulated rules which both seeks to
disguise and to minimize the need for such choice, once the general rule
has been laid down. One way of doing this is to freeze the meaning of
the rule so that its general terms must have the same meaning in every
case where its application is in question. To secure this we may fasten
on certain features present in the plain case and insist that these are both
necessary and sufficient to bring anything which has them within the
scope of the rule, whatever other features it may have or lack, and
whatever may be the social consequence of applying the rule in this
42
way.
Hart's designation of formalism as a vice may not be so predictably applicable
in terms of a court dependent upon the majority decision of nine Justices. (Justice
Black is a prime example of the value of a formalist on a plural court). Hart
concludes:
We shall be forced by this technique to include in the scope of a rule
cases which we would wish to exclude in order, to give effect to
reasonable social aims, and which the open textured terms of our
language would have allowed us to exclude, had we left them less
rigidly defined. The rigidity of our classifications will thus war with our
43
aims in having or maintaining the rule.
But, an inverse necessity may frequently arise to include situations within a prior
tradition in order to check unreasonablesocial aims.
At the opposite pole of legal thinking from formalism, Hart locates ruleskepticism:
The rule-sceptic is sometimes a disappointed absolutist; he has found
that rules are not all they would be in a formalist's heaven, or in a world
where men were like gods and could anticipate all possible combinations of fact, so that open-texture was not a necessary feature of rules.
The sceptic's conception of what it is for a rule to exist, may thus be an
unattainable ideal, and when he discovers that it is not attained by what
are called rules, he expresses his disappointment by the denial that there
are, or can be, any rules.'
Formalism and rule-skepticism are, as Hart indicates, "the Scylla and Charybdis
42
Id.
43

at 126.
Id. at 126-7.
4Id.
at 135.
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of juristic theory; they are great exaggerations, salutary where they correct each
other, and the truth lies between them." 45 The inescapable conclusion that emerges
from a study of Supreme Court history is that criticisms of the Court have largely
failed to recognize the signal importance of extremes mediating each other and have
concentrated upon the necessity of one overriding the other. Paul A. Freund
observes: "There are several pitfalls in single-minded thinking.., serious risks in
grasping--shall I say blowing--only one hom of a constitutional dilemma ....
Single-minded decisions suffer from a loss of insights that the cross-lights of
competing principles would furnish. "46 In his entertaining treatment of Justices
Black and Frankfurter, 47 James F. Simon flirts with this conclusion: "Black's core
message was, in fact, true. The Court and the nation were stronger because Black
and Frankfurter had served together. Black's and Frankfurter's open challenges to
each other often pushed them to their best and most impassioned advocacy."48
When Alexander M. Bickel, in The Morality of Consent,49 summarily disposes
of Justice Black as a "liberal contractarian" (Bickel's bete noir) in favor of the
"pragmatic skepticism" 50 allegedly preached by Edmund Burke and practiced by
Justice Holmes5 1 (a prototypal rule-skeptic), Bickel's argument takes on the intractability he attributes to Justice Black's formalism. Bickel makes unfortunate use of
certain crucial terms. By ascribing to Justice Black a "moral" stance, one that
judges each case essentially upon a "storehouse of principles", 5 2 Bickel suggests a
separation of Justice Black from any norm ofjudicial behavior.53 He simply removes
the formalist pole from legal-mindedness altogether and relocates it under the amorphous cover of an undefined morality. (He is more persuasive when Justice Warren,
inheritor of the "frontier" lawyer-moralist tradition, rather than Justice Black, is
involved). Furthermore, in the conjunction of "pragmatic" and "skepticism",
Bickel is ignoring the tension between the two attitudes. Pragmatism stresses
practical consequences for the purpose of explicating pre-existing legal premises
while skepticism tends to minimize or completely deny their validity. This is the
thrust of Justice Holmes's pronouncement that "The life of the law has not been
logic; it has been experience' ",5 which is as polarized as a legal mind can get. It may
lead to its own menacing" storehouse of principles" 55 when Justice Holmes can say

IId. at 144.
P. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 36 (1968).
47

J. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS:

HuGo BLACK, FEX FRANKFURTER AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN MODERN AMERICA

(1989).
41id. at 258-59.
49

A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975).

50

1d. at 8.
"1Id. at 3-5.
52 Id. at 8. Cf. Bickel's earlier, more halanced a.RQeremet
n "f Jiuctire B cr'e ftrral;sm ;.
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
'i

A

O.....

"-

85-98 (1962).

Id. at 89.

O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
5 BicKEL, supra note 52, at 8.
A
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to his fellow traveler, Justice Frankfurter, that:
Patriotism is the demand of the territorial club for priority, and as much
priority as it needs for vital purposes, over such tribal groups as the
churches and trade unions. I go the whole hog for the territorial club-and I don't care a damn if it interferes with some of the spontaneities of
56
the other groups.
A patriotism flirting with chauvinism seems to be a trademark of the rule-skeptics,
for even they must have some place to hang their hats. The larger and more
amorphous the "place" the less committed they need to consider themselves to be.
A.

PrototypalRule-Skeptics: Justices Roger B. Taney and
Oliver W. Holmes, Jr.

In most situations the rule-skeptic as Supreme Court Justice will support
legislative bodies--Congress or state legislatures--because normally these bodies
will concentrate upon the passage of "patriotic" laws; i.e. those in the national or
state interest. Rarely, and only when subject to severe pressure, do they contemplate
laws to protect the individual rights of citizens. In the final analysis, rule-skeptics
consider themselves obliged to defer to the will of the majority ordinarily represented by elected officials, since they have little or no faith in the stored wisdom of
the past. They are oriented to needs rather than rights. Rights presumably being the
province of the courts, the consequences of high-calibre Justices like Taney, Holmes
and Frankfurter pitting their talents against personal rights that quarrel with the
"flag", are extremely puzzling and disconcerting to their would-be admirers. The
ultimate and, to many liberals, unpalatable realization (because of the intermingling
of personal and property rights) is that the formalists on the court--the Marshalls, the
Fields, the Sutherlands, the Blacks--most consistently represent that crowning virtue
of the Supreme Court--defense of individual rights.
A rule-skeptic cannot bring himself to believe that any premise (and each right
is impaled on a fixed premise) is necessarily valid. It is therefore hard for him (for
he is inordinately proud of his intellectual integrity) to defend blindly, say, a First or
Fourteenth Amendment right when it is, in his opinion, opposed by the "national
interest". This is more readily apparent in the case of men like Justices Holmes and
Frankfurter, but it may also shed some light on the interesting puzzle of Chief Justice
Taney and his Dred Scott57 decision.
1. Rule-Skeptic Chief Justice Roger B. Taney
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, as the first "great" rule-skeptic to appear on the
56 BICKEL, supra note 49, at 48 (quoting Oliver W. Holmes to Felix Frankfurter, March 27, 1917, Holmes

Papers (Harvard Law Library)).

"' Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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Supreme Court, reflects (like Justice Felix Frankfurter who would compel public
school students to salute the American flag at the expense of the First Amendment58 )
the dominance in Americanrule-skepticism of a patriotic impulse. Taney voided the
Missouri Compromise in order, so he believed, to save the sacred Union from
dissolution over the slavery question.
Before the Dred Scott case, Justice Taney generally followed the predictable
route of a rule-skeptic in refusing wherever possible to substitute his premises for
those of legislative bodies, which, as indicated, generally emphasize societal
interests. In his Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge opinion,59 Justice Taney
states: "While the rights of private property are sacredly guarded, we must not forget
that the community also have rights, and that the happiness and well being of every
citizen depends on their faithful preservation."-60 It is true enough, as Don E.
Fehrenbacher states, that "The Taney Court, then, without renouncing any of its
power of review, tended to use the power sparingly where the Constitutionality of
state legislation was at stake."'" But it is to legislation generally rather than states'
rights that Taney tends to defer; it is not peculiarly the state as an entity opposed to
the Federal Government that invites his solicitude. In U.S. v. Gratiot,62 for example,
he upheld the power of the United States over its public lands even when situated in
a state, and in Holmes v. Jennison,61 he asserted the exclusive authority of the Federal
Government to control foreign relations.
The primary focus when one thinks of Justice Taney is, of course, the Dred
Scott decision. Much like Justice Marshall's stand in the Burr trials, Justice Taney's
opinion is regarded as a politically-motivated deviation from an otherwise laudatory
judicial career. Fehrenbacher finds that "....

the conception of Taney as a major

prophet and successful practitioner of judicial self-restraint leads easily to the view
that theDred Scott decision was an unfortunate aberration, a false step out of
character and into the 'political thicket"',' but concludes that the decision "represented no 'aberration'--no sharp break with a Taney Court tradition of judicial self65
restraint--because that tradition is itself largely illusive."
When we regard Justice Taney's stance as that of a rule-skeptic instead of the
shifting, subsumed one of "self-restraint", his Dred Scott opinion is entirely
consistent with the broad sweep of his judicial career. As suggested previously, the
focus of the skeptic is on societal interests, often at the expense of the individual.
Since this focus generally parallels that of the legislature, it masquerades as judicial
58Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).

19Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
60Id. at 548.
61 D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AmuFisit-N LAW & PCtrma 230 (1978).
62 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526 (1840).
63 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).
6See FEHRENBACHER, DRED Scorr, supra note 6 1, at 23 1.
6Id. at 234.
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deference (self-restraint) toward the legislature. If, however, a paramount societal
interest appears to be contrary to legislative action, the judicial rule-skeptic will
consider it his patriotic duty to oppose the legislative will, as Taney did in the Dred
Scott case.
Only a decent and courageous man could have met the test of the circumstances confronting Chief Justice Taney and his court. His decision was not the
trivialized rationale of a pro-slavery advocate, or66 of "a southern gentleman", as
Fehrenbacher, among others, evidently believes.

The language in Taney's Dred Scott opinion67 illustrates a dominant characteristic in the rule-skeptical mode of thought: its use of historical detail to override
the general propositions relied upon by the formalistic group. "The life of the law
has not been logic; it has been experience ' 68 and "a page of history is worth a
volume of logic' ',69 concludes Justice Holmes in two of his more elegant aphorisms.
The historical areas of concern in Dred Scott involved the legal status of blacks and
the power of Congress to legislate slavery.
Taney's threshold survey of black American history is indeed shocking to
modem sensibilities. In law, is there such a thing as the unspoken word, something
perhaps to go with the unwritten law? Probably not. Sooner or later, the words that
might be, are said. Something of this order flashes through the reader's mind as he
is asked to face the facts that Negroes were regarded as "beings of an inferior order,
and altogether unfit to associate with the white race.., and so far inferior, that they
had no rights which the white man was bound to respect";70 that they were "treated
as an ordinary article of merchandise' .7 The terrifying act of Chief Justice Taney
in the Dred Scott case was not his decision; after all, seven out of nine Justices sided
with him. It was not even the issues he chose to confront. It was finally his words.
Before the Civil War, in any New England state, apart from the fringe of abolitionists, did any white man feel that a black, free or slave, had any rights he was bound
to respect? The furor over Taney's language was not due primarily to its outrageousness, its slanting, perhaps, of historical fact, but to the shock of recognition of a
pervasive racism in the best of Americans that touched raw nerves.
The formalist listens to a different interior voice. There is no other way to put
it. Guided by, and devoted to, basic precedent rules, he follows them to their logical
conclusions. His arguments are, if less imaginative, much tidier. There may be, as
well, a certain preciosity about them. Take the dissenting opinion of Justice Curtis
in the Dred Scott case. It was evident to everyone that Dred Scott was a slave, but
Id. at 3, 234, 335-88, 559-60.
6 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 399-454.
Howe, supra note 54.
9New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
70
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407.
I' at 407.
Id.
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since the pleadings before the Court stated only that he was of African ancestry and
slave parentage and did not specifically plead him to be a slave, Justice Curtis argued
the fact of his slavery had to be excluded from consideration.7 2
Taney's declaration that the Missouri Compromise 73 was unconstitutional ran
counter to the ordinary rule-skeptical tolerance of legislation. It did so because of
the overriding devotion of the rule-skeptic to the societal interest, a devotion
increasingly shared in the twentieth century by many intellectuals both on and off the
Court. It is hardly surprising, then, to witness a spectacular rise in Taney's
reputation, which culminated in his inclusion among the twelve "greatest" Justices
in a 1972 poll. 74 It is even more predictable to find him idolized by Justice
Frankfurter:
Eventually, Frankfurter hoped, it would become "intellectually disreputable" to see Taney predominantly as the judicial defender of
slavery... Then, in an astonishing contribution to Dred Scott folklore,
he continued:
He [Taney] would probably have explained his policy on the
Court in language not dissimilar to that of Lincoln's famous
letter to Horace Greeley: "My paramount object in this
struggle is to save the Union and is not either to save or to
destroy slavery."
Frankfurter closed his lecture on Taney by placing the latter "second to
Marshall in the constitutional history of our country.'
'5

In view of the emphasis upon individual rights made by the fonnalists, and the
guardianship role accorded the Supreme Court as to such rights, it seems somewhat
perverse for modem professors of law, history and political science to tend to favor
the rule-skeptics. Of course, during the 1930's, marked by President Roosevelt's
program of social reform and experimentation, the formalists, with their preachments of individual rights became the "villains" of the period. The answer may lie
in the psychological realm: intellectuals generally feel easier with the more
intellectualized members of the Court--with Justices Stone, Brandeis, Cardozo,
Frankfurter, and, above all, with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
2. Rule-Skeptic Justice Oliver W. Holmes, Jr.
Justice Holmes, appointed by Theodore Roosevelt, served on the Supreme
72Id.
3

at 569-70.

1 Congressional Act of March 6, 1820 prohibiting slavery in a portion of the western territory owned by the
United States. U.S. Statutes, 3:545-548.
7 Blaustein and Mersky, Rating Supreme Court Justices, 58 A.B.A.J. 1183 (1972).
7 FEHRENBACHER, DRED ScoTr,

supra note 61, at 591-92.
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Court from 1902 until 1932. His tenure overlapped Justice John M. Harlan's for
eleven years and while they might side together on a case like Lochner v. New York,76
their divergent mental processes required them to file separate dissents. Holmes was
probably the most unqualifiedly rule-skeptical Justice who ever sat on the United
States Supreme Court, while Justice Harlan was an exemplary formalist. In the
pervasiveness of his rule-skepticism, Justice Holmes accepted, not the intelligence
or even common sense of legislatures, but the folly of attempting to interpose a
"better" judicial premise. In the absence of unvarnished legislative insanity, this led
him to insist on the legitimacy of state or federal enactments even at the expense of
individual rights--an insistence which made political labels, such as social progressive or reactionary, liberal or conservative, seem hopelessly contradictory. Justice
Holmes would champion maximum hours-of-work laws, as in the Lochner case,77
and then condone a statute in Bailey v. Alabama 8 making it a crime to fail to perform
a labor contract. In Meyer v. Nebraska,79 his dissent would have sustained a statute
forbidding the teaching of modem foreign languages in the public schools, and his
majority opinion in Buck v. Bell8" sustained a Virginia law under which mentally
retarded Carrie Buck was sterilized.
Justice Holmes was extremely adept at immunizing social legislation from
overriding legal principles, which he regarded generally as treacherous and unreliable dogma. He was perhaps the most talented of our legal writers with a first-rate
style and intelligence that he used to develop rule-skepticism into a fine art. His
opinions tend to make opposing formalistic language seem club-footed and perversely stubborn. Yet, with hindsight, Justice McReynold's majority opinion in
Meyer 8 1 has considerable power and majesty while Justice Holmes's aphorisms in
Bailey82 or Buck13 are not quite as pithy as they once might have seemed.
The problem in Meyer was whether or not a Nebraska statute, prohibiting the
teaching of modem foreign languages through the eighth grade, violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. Meyer was convicted of teaching German to an eighth
grade child. Liberals still affected by the Rooseveltian period of Justices Sutherland,
Butler, McReynolds and company, during which New Deal legislation was voided,
are jarred by the realization that it was James C. McReynolds, in a majority opinion
that reversed Meyer's conviction, who thought "the State may do much, go very far,
indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and
morally . . . but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be
76198 U.S. 45 (1905) (Harlan I., dissenting) (Holmes, J., dissenting) See 2 Filler, JOHN M. HARLAN, in THE
JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS

Israel eds. 1969).
" Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
78 219 U.S. 219 (1911) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
79262 U.S. 390 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
o 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
81262 U.S. at 396.
82219 U.S. at 245.
83274 U.S. at 205.
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respected.' '84 Meanwhile, Justice Holmes, putting his best "patriotic" foot forward,
felt that "it is desirable that all the citizens of the United States should speak a
common tongue... Youth is the time when familiarity with a language is established
and if... a child would hear only Polish or French or German spoken at home I am
not prepared to say it is unreasonable to provide that in his early years he shall hear
and speak only English at school." 85 The rule-skeptical concentration on patriotism
and the societal interest is also apparent in Holmes's Buck tough-minded opinion
involving the sterilization of Carrie Buck, the feeble-minded mother of a feebleminded daughter, as well as the feeble-minded daughter of a feeble-minded mother:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the
best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon
those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices
...in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is
better for all the world, if

. .

.society can prevent those who are

manifestly unfit from continuing their kind ...Three generations of
86
imbeciles are enough.
Justice Holmes lays bare the bones of a Constitutional dilemma in his Lochner
dissent87 to the voiding of a New York statute that limited a baker's working day to
ten hours: is the United States Constitution (not just any constitution) "made for
people of fundamentally differing views' '88 even when those differing views conflict
with Constitutionally-mandated principles of individual rights? Justice Holmes,
gauging the open-ended "fundamental principles as they have been understood by
the traditions of our people and our law",89 says yes, "A reasonable man might think
[a baker's ten-hour day] a proper measure on the score of health. Men whom I
certainly could not pronounce unreasonable would uphold it as a first installment of
a general regulation of the hours of work.' '90
The "reasonable man" is that brilliant concept, fictional of course, without
which the law could hardly continue to function. It is essentially the creation of the
rule-skeptical turn of mind in its suspicion of control by inflexible premises. But it
is rarely a persuasive argument to the formalist, as Justice Peckham, who wrote the
majority opinion in Lochner,9' so clearly reveals. At the threshold, the legal mind,
whether formalistic or rule-skeptical, .is faced with the Fourteenth Amendment
under which no state can deprive a person of life, liberty or property without "due"
process of law. "The right to purchase or sell labor," says Justice Peckham, "is part
84Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.
8

5ld.at 412.

96Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
8
7 lfn.hner10,
98t U
. 74.
91 1d. at 76.
9

' 1d.
9 Id.
91Id. at 52.
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of the liberty protected by this amendment, unless there are circumstances which
exclude the right." 9 2 Justice Holmes, of course, resorts to "circumstances". The
statute, he claims, is a health measure. At least a "reasonable" man could find it to
be a health measure. 93 This is not really the issue and both judges, knowing it,
continue to play out the farce. Peckham says that it simply is not a health measure
but only pretends to be. 94 Peckham is probably right. The legislation is rather more
social and economic in intent. Holmes, not much of a masquerader, throws off the
disguise; the "health" measure is really "a first installment of a general regulation
of the hours of work." 95
The critical area in the case involves the subsequent development of a rationale
by which the formalists can sustain eminently fair, just and desirable legislation
without violating their sacred sense of individual rights. How, they question, can
there be liberty of contract, liberty to sell as well as buy labor, if the seller is
handcuffed? With a curious sleight-of-hand, then, the formalists restore "liberty"
of contract by also tying the labor purchaser's hands behind him, as if to say, "Only
if all our hands are tied can we bargain freely." Indeed, there is no liberty to sell labor
9 6 some 32
if one has to give it away. By the time of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish
years later, Chief Justice Hughes, although still flirting with the health mask,
speaking for a predominantly formalistic court, had no problem in sustaining a state
law providing women workers with a minimum wage. InNLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.,97 he made it clear that, for a formalist, without equality of treatment,

there could be no liberty. 98
Perhaps the most interesting exposure of Justice Holmes's rule-skepticism is
in that most provocative of American legal arenas--freedom of speech and the First
and Fourteenth Amendments which guard it. Freedom of speech, after all, offers to
the rule-skeptical mind a conundrum. If the rule-skeptic prizes and holds inviolable
any premise, it has to be freedom of speech, since it involves the right of any premise
to be questioned and disputed. At the same time a premise itself, how can it be held
immune from suspicion? A Justice like Justice Black whose formalism holds the
First Amendment most dear is in much better shape than, say, a Justice Holmes, who
tends to waffle over the First Amendment--unless it collides with his sense of
patriotism: "When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace
are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as
men fight ......

•
Id. at 53.
93
Id.at 76.
94id. at58.
95id. at 76.
9 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
97301 U.S. 1 (1937).
98
Id. at 33.
" Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss1/5

16

Lebowitz: Supreme Court's Legal Mind
Summer, 1990)

SUPREME COURT'S LEGAL MIND

There is no situation in which the interests of national security and individual
rights are more on a collision course than in the area of free speech. There is no
situation in which the rule-skeptical mind is doubled back upon itself in greater
agony. Justice Cardozo once remarked in a different context that danger invited
rescue, and the old warrior Justice Holmes, leaping astride his white horse, could
never resist his country's siren call, even if it meant trampling the First Amendment.
B.

PrototypalLegal Formalists: Justices John Marshall,John
M. Harlan, CharlesE. Hughes, and Hugo L. Black

By way of contrast, it is no accident that the Supreme Court Justices most
obviously partisan toward individual rights have exhibited the clearest examples of
formalism. These include Justices Marshall, Harlan, Hughes, and Black. The
primary rule governing a society as a whole is its urge to survive and this hardly
requires formalization. However, the indifference of a society and its rulers to the
needs and desires of its constituent individuals can, and has, led to its destruction.
From this recognition the sense of individual rights has evolved in the symbiotic
form--societal and individual claims feeding on each other. The creation of rules
establishing each individual right is highly artificial--and emotional. Individual
rights are ultimately a matter of faith. The freedom of a person to speak or write, the
right of a person not to be arbitrarily deprived of his property, are pronouncements
made into scripture, not by God but by men, and faithfully enforced by men. Fierce
adherence to rules inevitably smacks of dogmatism, a particularly unpalatable word
to intellectuals, leading those like Justices Holmes and Frankfurter to its hazardous
counterpart, rule-skepticism, that judicial attitude which on the Supreme Court
maintains, in effect, "Let Congress do it." I say, hazardous, because Congress,
society's survival mechanism, has little or no interest in creating the premises for the
protection of individual rights. It will profess interest only when their absence
threatens society's very existence, as in the various civil rights enactments.
1. Formalist Chief Justice John Marshall
Among the Justices, great or otherwise, Chief Justice John Marshall has a
unique status. He is credited in a vague way with being one of those founding fathers
who set the United States on its path toward supremacy among nations. Yet, of
course, he was despised and feared by Jefferson, who referred to "the rancorous
hatred which Marshall bears to the Government of his country'1 ° and to "the
cunning and sophistry within which he is able to enshroud himself." ' 0' He was to
Jefferson the menace of a judge gone mad: "The judiciary of the United States is
the subtle corps of sappers and miners constantly working underground to undermine the foundations of our confederated fabric." 12
'oo 11 JEFFERSON
101Id.

140 (letter to James Madison, May 23, 1810).

at 177-78 (letter to Thomas
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
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Jefferson's tune is to be echoed by strong-willed presidents succeeding him
and the refrain is much the same. Protesting the curbing of presidential power by the
Supreme Court, the claim is made that the "will of the people" (a euphemism for
the presidential will) is being thwarted. So it is that Marshall's resistance to the
arbitrary exercises of presidential power in such instances as Marbury v. Madison
and the Aaron Burr and associates treason trials most offended Jefferson. This
resistance, however, more than a partisan effort to bedevil Jefferson, reflects the
vision of a formalist legal mind applying itself to premises suggested by a Constitutional structure. Marshall meant it when he declared in 1803:
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future
government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to
their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole American fabric
has been erected ...The principles, therefore, so established, are

is
deemed fundamental. And as the authority from which they proceed
03
permanent.1
be
to
designed
are
they
act,
supreme, and can seldom
The striking nature of Marshall's performance becomes clear when he is
compared to the cluster of Justices who preceded him in the ten years before he was
appointed Chief Justice by John Adams in 1801. These men were hardly to be
regarded lightly in terms of intelligence and breadth of legal training. They included
such outstanding people as John Jay, James Wilson, John Blair and Oliver Ellsworth.
Yet the Supreme Court during this period gives the impression of treading water, of
forming no coherent philosophy, and of relying as much on common law and
European jurisprudential precedents as on the newly formed Constitution that
strained to bound from the wings to front center stage. One of the problems of the
early Court that Marshall swiftly diagnosed and eliminated was the habit of each
Justice rendering his own majority opinion. The resulting cacophony made it
impossible to create a consistent body of principles around which future decisions
might cohere. In Chisholm v. Georgia,'°4 for example, Justice Iredell pontificated
at length'0 5 on the observations of a Lord Somers in a 17th century English case
concerning "the general remedy by petition to the King' ,,106 while Justice Wilson
delivered an elaborate essay on the nature of statism and sovereignty through the
ages' 07 (e.g., the Ephori of Sparta and Hottoman's Francogallia). 108 At the same time
Justices Blair °9 and Cushing,"' anticipating Marshall but submerged in the gaggle
of opinions, thought the point should turn not "on the various European confederations [but] on the Constitution of the United States . ..
103Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176.
104 2

U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).

105
Id. at 437-49.

Id. at 439.
at 457-61.
Id. at 459.
109
Id. at 450-53.
11O
Id.at 466-69.
'0

107Id.
108

11Id. at 450.
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Overall, what made Marshall succeed in enforcing basic Constitutional
precepts at a period when they might easily have been rhetorical (as was the Bill of
Rights until after the Civil War)" 2 was his compelling faith in the formalizing
process itself, his faith that the judicial declaration of Constitutional principles as
fundamental and paramount made them so even when contradictory to state laws,
laws of Congress, or prevailing political trends. It was not that Marshall, after
Marbury v. Madison, ever again dealt with the unconstitutionality of a Congressional act. He did not. It was the unequivocal invocation of this power, as well as
his delineation of the various powers of Congress, particularly in the regulation of
commerce, that made the difference." 3 Rules, bland on paper, spring to life only
when it is established that they are, in fact, ruling.
Chief Justice Marshall's devotion to individual rights is obscured when one
considers property interests since the word "property" red-flags so many twentieth
century sensibilities. While personal rights still fire the liberal imagination, property
rights slide off as a class attribute. To Marshall these referred not so much to the
possession of property as to the "right to possess what one has worked for"." 4
Rugged individualism or Nixon Agonistes"5 if you like but a concern in any event,
in the face of popular pressures, that governments should not, except in extremis, be
permitted to unmake the self-made man. Once a property right is vested in a person,
said Marshall, the government, even in the name of the public welfare, cannot divest
the right. 16 After all, the Constitution went out of its way to forbid the states to impair
contract obligations;" 7 the vesting of property rights was not Marshall's invention.
So, in Fletcher,"8 although the people of Georgia had been defrauded of lands by
their state legislature, Marshall would not permit a later legislature to rescind the
titles of innocent purchasers. When a New Hampshire legislature tried to amend the
1769 corporate charter of Dartmouth College so as to control the private college,
Marshall said no. 19 The fierce and unyielding commitment of Marshall and his
fellow formalists to individual rights has dignified and illuminated Supreme Court
history at the same time that property rights have been the source of much bitterness.
2. Formalist Justice John M. Harlan
Justice Harlan, an earlier prototype of Justice Hugo Black, is a prime example
of a formalist Justice who, if considered simply on political or moral terms, or
property rights affirmation, can only be regarded as puzzling, perverse and unpredictable. Serving on the court from 1877 until 1911, after appointment by President
"12 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 137.
13 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
114 R. FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN MARSHALL 18 (1968).
1o!96'\
OA'
"15 G. Wu.us. NIxON AnQr, Q: THE (R',, OF THE SELF-MADE
16See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810).
117 U.S. CONST. art. I, 10.
"1 10 U.S. at 87.
"9 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
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Hayes, he appears to the contemporary mind to be, at the same time, champion and
enemy of liberalism. From a slave-holding background he became the stoutest
defender of equal rights for blacks in the early days of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the Civil Rights Cases,120 he dissented from the majority opinion that permitted
denying accommodations for blacks in hotels, theaters and railroads. He opposed the
majority view in Plessy v. Ferguson... that states under their "police power" could
provide "equal but separate" railway carriages for blacks and whites--the "separate
but equal" doctrine that prevailed until 1954, a period of 58 years. 2 Harlan's
dissent is a primer for civil rights advocates: "But in view of the Constitution, in the
eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.
There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens."23
Justice Harlan felt that after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, none
of the rights enumerated in the federal Bill of Rights could any longer be impaired
or destroyed by a state. 124 Lying at the heart of Harlan's (and later Justice Black's)
running dispute with the Court majority was its reliance on "those fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions. j' 25 To Harlan's fierce insistence that the individual must be protected
from the clutch of such ambiguity, Justice Matthews, in his Hurtado 26 majority
opinion anticipating Justices Holmes and Frankfurter, counters: "[A]ny legal
proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom, or
newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general
public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must
1 7
be held to be due process of law.'
It is terribly difficult for the rule-skeptical frame of mind to subscribe to the
inviolability of the written word, however solemnized, and the formalist is equally
reluctant, once having committed himself to a given Constitutional "shalt" or
"shalt not", to acknowledge extenuating circumstances. The problem, so often, in
settling a formalist once and for all in a groove is that, having accorded such a Justice
an inflexible set of principles, he is then assumed, unjustly, to be dominated by the
moral or political flavor surrounding his decisions. To be specific, since Justice
Harlan's devotion to individual rights was so unequivocal, and since he fought for
them against the majority of the Court, he is regarded as one of the earlier "great"
120 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
121163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
122See Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
123Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

124
See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing privilege against selfincrimination), Hurtadov. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing indictment
by a grand jury).
122Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 535.
126 id. at 519.
127
Id. at 537.
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liberals. 2 8

Yet this view must blindly disregard his antagonistic and (from the liberal
point of view) reactionary attitude, in the name of those same individual rights,
toward the struggle of labor unions for recognition. In the 1895 Debs 29 case, he sided
with the majority to sustain a federal injunction against railway strikers and
punishment of union leaders. Adair v. United States 3 ° found him striking down a
Congressional act against "yellow dog" contracts: "[T]he employer and the
employe[e] have equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is
an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract which no government can legally
justify in a free land."''
The ultimate thrust of Justice Harlan's mind was not, then, toward moralism
but toward a legal formalism operating from a sense of what followed from given
rules contained in the Bill of Rights. For Justice Harlan, individual rights, except in
extremis, were not to be tampered with by public pressures.
3. Formalist Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes
The entry upon the Supreme Court scene of Charles Evan Hughes, first from
1910 to 1916 as an Associate Justice appointed by President Taft and again from
1930 to 1941 as Chief Justice by courtesy of President Hoover, marks once again a
formalistic reliance upon Constitutional premises of individual rights and their
priority over social necessity. This emphasis in the embattled Hughes Court of the
1930's is highlighted by the Court's struggle with President Franklin Roosevelt's
emergency programs triggered by the Depression, a struggle which tends to obscure
the recognition of Justice Hughes as an ardent supporter of civil liberties. Hughes
wrote the majority opinion in Bailey v. Alabama,' declaring a statute, which made
failure to perform a labor contract a criminal offense, violated the Thirteenth
Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude. In McCabe v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,'33 he found a state law authorizing intrastate carriers to
provide sleeping and dining cars for white persons only, a denial of equal protection.
In Stromberg v. California,3 4 a Hughes opinion declared a statute unconstitutional
which made display of a red flag a crime. In Near v. Minnesota,'3 5 he struck down

a statute seeking to restrain "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" newspapers
and magazines. And in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,'3 6 he endorsed a

validating view of the National Labor Relations Act and the union movement in
general.
128See, e.g., C. REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND: THE EVOLUTION OF OUR LEGAL SYSTEM 401 n. (1980);
MORISON, J. TRUMBULL AND H. COMMAGER, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 789-90 (1969).

129
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
130208 U.S. 161 (1908).
"I' Id. at 175.
132219 U.S. at 227.
133235 U.S. 151 (1914).
134283 U.S. 359 (1931).
135283 U.S. 697 (1931).
1 301 U.S. at 1.
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The tarring of the Hughes Court with Franklin Roosevelt's brush, in retrospect, hardly seems to justify the calumny heaped upon the Court by the liberals of
the 1930's. The crisis was, of course, an economic one and economic solutions by
their very nature demand broad, steamrolling movements that tend to leave flattened,
paper-thin individuals in their wake. The "war" against poverty, like any national
fight for survival, brings enormous pressure to bear upon the individual and his
suddenly "trivialized" concerns. Economic crises, in particular, offer, as Marxist
theorists well know, great opportunities for reshuffling social and economic hierarchies.
The stress on the Constitution during the 1930's was not so much the primal
one of national survival threatening to overwhelm individual rights; it was rather
concerned, in the name of that national interest, with the expansion of presidential
power to an alarming degree. Not only did that expansion seem ominous to a large
number of thoughtful people at the time, but it seems even more so now that the
Nixonian experience has been absorbed.
Probably the most "infamous" anti-New Deal decision of them all, one of the
13 7
so-called "Black Monday" cases of May 27, 1935, was the Schechter Poultry
decision. Yet the Court agreed unanimously. Chief Justice Hughes was joined not
only by Justices Butler, Roberts, Van Devanter, Sutherland and McReynolds but by
Justices Stone, Brandeis and Cardozo. The National Industrial Recovery Act was
unconstitutional, Hughes declared, because "the discretion of the President in
approving or prescribing codes (of fair competition), and thus enacting laws for the
government of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. We
think that the code making authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power."139
Since New Deal days, it has become commonplace to split Supreme Court
decisions into those relating to economic rights and those pertaining to personal
liberties, and to attempt to classify Justices on the basis of this distinction. The results
have been, to put it charitably, unsatisfactory--distinguished more by what consequently appeared to be aberrant judicial behavior than devotion to an accredited
norm. When the deviations are compared with what "truths", if any, a particular
Justice holds to be self-evident (in other words, the range of his formalism, or lack
of it), they are revealed not as deviations after all, but as exclusions from a consistent
intellectual system. It is, consequently, far easier for a property rights champion like
McReynolds to protect civil liberties, as in Meyer, where Holmes is impelled to deny
them. 139 When Justice Brandeis maintains that the "rights of property and liberty of
the individual must be remoulded from time to time to meet the changing needs of
society",14 the rule-skeptic will translate this to demand a pervasive inertia of the
'17
138

Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
Id. at 542.

39
See 262 U.S. at 401,412.
'o
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 376 (1921).
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Court in the face of legislation. What a society needs is normally equated by a ruleskeptic with what a society's elected representatives say it needs.
4.

Formalist Justice Hugo L. Black and His Rule-Skeptic
Adversary, Justice Felix Frankfurter

Any polarized view of Supreme Court activities must, inevitably, simplify
pattems of thought woven from the minds of nine men. Yet, if the Supreme Court
can be conceived, metaphorically, as a seesaw with formalism weighting one end
and rule-skepticism the other, no two Justices can be more illustrative than Hugo L.
Black and Felix Frankfurter. The number of occasions in which one dissented from
the other is extraordinary.' 4 1 Going further, as Justice Frankfurter's diaries acknowledge, 4 2 the tensions between them encompassed far more than differences of legal
opinions and invaded intimate areas of personality.
There are attendant ironies. While Justice Frankfurter fiercely preached
judicial self-restraint and detachment, to the point of alienating himself from his old
43
liberal friends, he catapulted himself front and center into New Deal politics.
Justice Black, on the other hand, leaving behind a life of combative trial litigation and
political wars in the Senate, supercharging into the judicial arena, assiduously
avoided any involvement with entanglements outside the Court. "Black's public
sensations were purely as his work made them" comments John B. Frank. "His
personal life continued with a small group of family, a few friends, and the ever
lengthening list of clerks."'"
The effort to draw a universal lesson from Justice Frankfurter's highly charged
deference to the will of others, exhibited as an intellectual exercise while at the same
time backstage he was infiltrating the (a Frankfurter phrase) "political thicket",'41
emerges as an interesting transvaluation. It suggests as Justice Frankfurter's trigger
an immigrant's innocent and abiding trust in the "people's" legislature rather than,
Justice Holmes, a deep, dark distrust of human passions,
in imitation of his idol, 46
particularly one's own. 1
The "war" between Justices Frankfurter and Black is prefaced, ironically
enough, by harmony in the 1940 Gobitis4 7 case. Frankfurter, at the time of his
appointment the previous year, was expected to be the leader of the liberal wing of
the Court. The presumption of such liberality led all of the Justices, excepting only
supra note 47, particularly at 120-29, 170-83.
e.g., FELiX FRANKFURTER, FROM THE DIAuES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER, with biographical essay and notes
by Joseph P. Lash, 174, 275, 286-87 (1975).
143Id. at 75.
141

See

SIMON, ANTAGONISTS,

4

1 1See,

1 3 Friedman & israel, supra note 76, at 2345.
W4i
See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
",See FRANKFURTER,DIARIEs, supra note 142, at 77.
47Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 586.
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Justice Stone, and including Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy, to vote with him
to compel public school students to salute the American flag in violation of their
religious beliefs. "The wisdom of training children in patriotic impulses," he
48
declared, "... . is not for our independent judgment." 1
Justice Stone's refusal to agree bothered Frankfurter so much that he sent
Stone a five-page letter. 49 But Stone's dissent was only the tip of the iceberg.
Frankfurter's Gobitis opinion shocked his liberal friends and sent out irreversible
shock waves. When, shortly after Gobitis, on a visit to the White House, he
murmured to Eleanor Roosevelt, "The flag, the flag," she "did not presume to
question the Justice's legal scholarship and reasoning, but there seemed to be
something wrong with an opinion that forced little children to salute a flag when such
a ceremony was repugnant to their conscience."' 50 Several years later, Black,
Douglas and Murphy publicly admitted their error by reversing Gobitis in Barnette, 5' a second flag-salute case.
Expressions such as "judicial restraint" are misleading when Justice Frankfurter confronts a situation like the Adamson 52 case in which he refuses to make the
federal privilege against self-incrimination effective against the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment. In reaction to Justice Black's insistence that the first eight
Amendments to the Constitution were incorporated into the Fourteenth, and thus
applicable to state laws, Frankfurter's "search" for a becoming modesty in the
exercise of judicial power is derailed in favor of that judge ideally endowed with
impeccable scholarship and infinite wisdom. Frankfurter picks his way through the
minefields of "canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of
judgment of English speaking peoples"' 5 3 and "the idiosyncrasies of a merely
personal justice' ',154 and arrives triumphantly at the "right" decision. The concept
of judicial restraint is further compromised by the rejection of those "legal forms.
. of the Eighteenth Century' , (Bill of Rights) in favor of "a scheme of ordered
1 56
liberty.''
Justice Black is not about to let Frankfurter rest content on the horns of his
intellectual dilemma:
This decision reasserts a constitutional theory

. . .

that this court is

endowed by the Constitution with boundless power under "natural
law" periodically to expand and contract constitutional standards to
'14 d. at 598.
DImuES, supra note 142, at 69.
Id. at 70. For other adverse liberal reactions see Id., at 69-70.

149FRANKFURTER,
'50

"I'West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 643-46 (1943).

52
'1
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
53
1 Id. at 67.
S- Id. at 68.

Id. at 66.

115
156

Id. at 65 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1938)).
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conform to the Court's conception of what at a particular time constitutes "civilized decency" and "fundamental liberty and justice."...
I think that

. . .

the "natural law" theory of the Constitution . . .

degrade[s] the constitutional safeguards of the Bill of Rights and
simultaneously appropriate[s] for this Court a broad power which we
15 7
are not authorized by the Constitution to exercise
The paradox--that both Justice Frankfurter and Justice Black are vehemently
celebrating judicial restraint while directly contradicting each other--is resolved
fairly easily. Frankfurter, patronizing "Eighteenth Century" sanctionsI 8 restrains
himself from second-guessing contemporary legislative bodies or law enforcement
officers. Black, on the other hand, is fiercely partial to the "wisdom" of those
eighteenth century men and their Constitutional package and resists substituting his
judgment for theirs.' 59 It is tempting, in view of the constancy of human nature (at
least as we have divined it from Aristotle on), to prefer Black's trust in the intellectual
integrity of Madison, Wilson and company rather than in the typical state legislator.
Black was at least as willing as Frankfurter, and probably more unequivocally so (he
made no distinction between unwise and unreasonable), to defer to legislative
judgments when the superior wisdom of the Founding Fathers (i.e. a clear Constitutional mandate) did not intervene. In the 1963 Ferguson160 case, he will comment,
"Under the system of government created by our Constitution, it is up to legislatures,
not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation."' 61 Earlier, in 1945,
he had affirmed that "Representatives elected by the people to make their laws,
rather than judges appointed to interpret these laws, can best determine the policies
which govern the people. That at least is the basic principle on which our democratic
society rests." 1 62 Black was prepared to insist that the "balancing" or "weighing"
doctrine "plainly encourages and actually invites judges to choose for themselves
between conflicting values, even where, as in the First Amendment, the Founders
made a choice of values, one of which is a free press. ' ' 63 Bugging and other
eavesdropping cases compelled him, as specifically mandated by the Fourth Amendment, to make a judicial determination of "reasonableness". On the side opposing
Justice Douglas, Justice Black felt that any kind of eavesdropping was not a search
or seizure restricted by the Fourth Amendment.I I
Where the Constitution did not explicitly forbid or command, Justice Black
was perfectly prepared to be a guardian of wisdom and to assess the "reasonableness" of a legislative or executive act--to do his own "weighing". Since the Fifth
157id. at 69-70.
5
"I
Id. at 66.
09 See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
160 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).

161 Id at 79.

Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 794-95 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting).
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 399 (1967) (Black, J., concurring).
'6 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967)
(Black,
J., dissenting); United States
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1991 v. White, 401 U.S. 745, (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
162 Southern
'63 See
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Amendment did not contain an "equal protection" clause, it was possible for Black
in the Korematsu 165 case (horrifying and confounding his civil libertarian

fans 16 6) to

"curtail the civil rights of a single racial group" by weighing them against that most
"pressing public necessity", the waging of war. 67 "[T]he military authorities,"

concluded Black, "considered [in excluding Japanese Americans from certain West
Coast areas during World War II] that the need for action was great, and time was
short. We cannot--by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight--now
say that at that time these actions were unjustified." 6 8 In a state tax case, 169 Black
argued that the tax should stand against the charge of violating the interstate
commerce clause, since it was not shown to be unreasonable in amount for the
privilege claimed.
The Bill of Rights represented to Justice Frankfurter a collection of ambiguous
aphorisms that required nothing less than the highest standard of judicial wisdom
(which he defined, simply, as his wisdom) to set right. The inevitable consequence
was, of course, to make him the most intransigent adversary of Justice Black's push
not only to enshrine the first eight Amendments in the American legal canon, but to
incorporate them in the Fourteenth Amendment. It seems odd for an intellectual like
Frankfurter to defer to the" wisdom" of local school board members, but this is what
his rule-skepticism finally came down to in such cases as Gobitis.
It was not as though Justice Black's "incorporation" theory was novel. It had
been pursued earlier by a pair of bright, energetic and persistent Justices, mainly
under the Fourteenth Amendment clause relating to privileges and immunities of
United States citizens, which seemed even more potentially expansive at the time
than due process. What, at first blush, would seem more privileged and immune than
a citizen's protections under the first eight Amendments? This was how Justice
Harlan saw it' 70 and the way JusticeField saw it.' 7 '
While it may offend some observers with a sense of its rigidity or force Justice
Black into an occasional cul-de-sac, Black's method of handling the Fourteenth
Amendment possesses the virtues of logical consistency and realization of Frankfurter's dream of judicial humility and detachment. It is consistent because it can
blend personal and economic liberties. After all, the Fourteenth Amendment in its
mandate (that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law") sets up no dichotomy. In re-defining rights under the due
process clause to be simply those enumerated in the first eight Amendments, Black
'65
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214.

supra note 47, at 155.
'67Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
168Id. at 223-24.
169McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176 (1940) (Black, J., dissenting).
70See Twining, Hurtado,supra note 124.
166Cf. SIMON,

"I'See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting).
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eliminated the logically impossible necessity of explaining why deprivation of life
or liberty rights violated due process when denial of property rights did not. This
intellectual dilemma triggered in other Justices gadfly notions of "preferred freedoms" so detested by Frankfurter' 72 and "natural law" due process excursions so
despised by Black. 73 It fostered "judicial balancing" between personal rights and
national security, and the "penumbra" conceit developed by Justice Douglas 74 to
catch any vagrant personal freedoms that might otherwise slip through the constitutional net.
Justice Black's insistence on strait-jacketing the Fourteenth Amendment with
ties to the Bill of Rights is based upon a number of recognitions, each of which is
simple enough by itself, and ends in a simple enough result, but like a Dickens plot,
they produce along the way by innumerable combinations, an exceedingly complex
structure. A primal recognition is that the smaller the governmental entity the more
the individual has to fear from its uncontrolled power, essentially because intolerance flares with intimacy. This explains to a large degree the virtual non-existence
of Bill of Rights cases prior to the Civil War. The federal government, before the
sophisticated communications network of the twentieth century, was a place distant
from most citizens more intent upon wrenching rights from states.
The Fourteenth Amendment contains some very general language. Obviously,
due process is a term already employed in the Bill of Rights but it was general there,
too, and hard to reduce to unequivocality, although debt-ridden intellectuals like
John Quincy Adams, still steeped in the Lockean faith (and hardly one of those
ruthless nineteenth century entrepreneurs Horwitz accuses of corrupting American
contract and tort law to suit their propertied self-interest 7 5) had no trouble with
embracing property as one of the "inalienable" rights:
This I take to be the origin of Government. It is founded on persons and
on property. And if Democracy is founded exclusively on persons and
not on property, I fear it will follow the tendency of its nature and
degenerate into ochlocracy and Lynch Law, burning down convents and
hanging abolitionists or gamblers, without Judge or Jury, without fear
76
of God to restrain, and without remorse to punish. 1
Other clauses of the Bill of Rights are somewhat different. They state
themselves more specifically and forcefully. Unless an imperative is unequivocal
and so simply stated as to be not readily misunderstood, it cannot be an imperative
at all. But the first eight Amendments, apart from the due process clause, are so
171See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Ullnan v. United States,
350 U.S. 422 (1956).
:7See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 69-70; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 511-13.
'74
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483.
'71HoRwrrz, supra note 25.
176S.BEMIS, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE UNION 60-61 n.23 (1956).
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unequivocal and so simply stated that they are, if anything in American society is,
commandments. They are to be obeyed, even in extremity, much as God was to be
obeyed when he ordered Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac, not for logic's sake, but
to prove his faith in even an illogical God. The Constitution when it is unequivocal
and simply stated is the American political deity.
Due process of law, a vague and ambiguous term, can attain the force of a
commandment only when its content is linked to a Constitutional unequivocality.
This cannot be done historically or rationally because the door is then opened for
equivocal arguments by various guardians of wisdom. What Justice Black wanted
was a Constitutional mandate that seals the Fourteenth Amendment within its
clauses and makes it inviolable. Only by excluding tentative rights can those that are
given be mandated. There is no room for shadows around the sun. There is no room
for balancing of interests. There is not even room for current "superior" wisdom
or hindsight experience. There is room only for the Constitutional given, when it is
given clearly--clearly, at least, even to a not particularly "reasonable" man.
Divorcing himself from any Bill of Rights imperatives, Justice Frankfurter
cannot finally insulate himself from passing upon the reasonableness of legislation
and, in so doing, cannot avoid, however much he may swear allegiance to humility
and disinterestedness, acting as a guardian of wisdom. "The indispensable judicial
requisite is intellectual humility,"' 77 he will say and then proudly avow, "they (the
Founding Fathers) set apart a body of men, who were to be depositories of law, who
by their disciplined training and character and by withdrawal from the usual
temptations of private interest may reasonably be expected to be 'as free, impartial,
and independent as the lot of humanity will admit," 178 or, "One does not have to
inhale the self-adulatory bombast of after-dinner speeches to affirm that all the
interests of man that are comprised under the constitutional guarantees given to'life,
79
liberty, and property' are in the professional keeping of lawyers." 1
However repellent the idea of guardians of wisdom may be to modem
liberalism's emphasis on equality, the Founding Fathers (at least Madison and James
Wilson) might still applaud any suggestion that, whatever their rhetoric, Supreme
Court Justices have in fact, by and large played out the Platonic vision, usually
manifested by a contentious combination of formalism and rule-skepticism. Undeniably the self-deprecation is necessary. The Supreme Court is fearfully undemocratic--ultimately responsible, despite the underlying pressures of public opinion
and personal histories, to the bent of its Justices' minds. Many of the seeming
paradoxes of legal thinking in a Frankfurter are resolved when the democratic and
flag-waving rhetoric is pushed to one side. Then we might well have Frankfurter
saying, "I don't believe that the Founding Fathers were that much wiser than an elite
'7

AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 557 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

T United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258,308 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
1'9
Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232,247 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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twosome of like-minded people such as Holmes and me." And Black, in positing
the Founding Fathers and their Bill of Rights as wiser than he (or a Frankfurter or
Holmes), was creating his own form of rhetoric. He was not a guardian of wisdom
in the abstract but, in due deference, of the Founding Fathers.
Once the thinking of a Justice can fairly be said to be slanted toward formalism
or rule-skepticism, trends in his decision-making become predictable. Formalists
like Justices Marshall and Black, simply by openly referring to their "storehouse of
principles", tend to expand Supreme Court power while rule-skeptics like Justices
Holmes and Frankfurter restrict it. Formalists are watchdogs of legislative and
executive power, while rule-skeptics prefer to look the other way. Formalists are
devoted to a vision of pre-existing (Constitutional) individual rights and believe that
society must defer to these rights, while rule-skeptics are inclined to bend the
individual's needs to meet those of the society--Holmes's "territorial club".
It is apparent that a phrase like "strict constructionist" becomes meaningless
since it depends upon whose power is being constricted. A formalist may strictly
construe Constitutional powers of Congress, a state legislature, or a President, while
a skeptic may strictly construe the powers of the Supreme Court itself or the
individual citizen. Just as clearly, to speak of Federal power on the one hand and
states' rights on the other becomes a hollow rhetorical exercise. In the defense of his
concept of individual rights, a formalist like Justice George Sutherland would no
180
more indulge state legislatures than he would Congress.
C.

PrototypalLawyer-Moralists: JusticesJoseph Story
and Earl Warren

The basic tension that has developed in the Supreme Court is between the
formalists and the rule-skeptics and expresses itself principally in preferences for
individual rights or public necessity. This dichotomy has been complicated by the
introduction of a hybrid form of legal-mindedness that fuses with morality to dispute
the validity of either of the purer forms. It essays, in effect, to undermine the basic
underpinning of reason itself, and surfaces early in Supreme Court history with,
surprisingly enough until his devotion to "natural law" is considered, Justice Joseph
Story.
1. Justice Joseph Story's Cloak of Formalism
Justice Story was appointed to the Supreme Court by Madison in 1811 and
served until 1845. He is of additional interest in being on both the Marshall and
Taney courts. Charles Warren concludes that within five years of his appointment,
Story had become an "ardent supr'"of

Justic

Marshall's "uiii.tionai

' See, e.g., Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting).
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While this was generally so, he was far from being Marshall's clone.
doctrines' ,.I81
Story, the Justice's Justice, the Harvard Law professor, the author of Story's
Commentaries, was, to begin with, a master logician from whose premises flowed
inexorable conclusions of the supremacy of the national judiciary and extensive
applicability of the English common law to American jurisprudence. Typical
opinions are Martin v. Hunter'sLessee,182 in which the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction over state courts in constitutional matters was declared, and Swift v.
Tyson's pronouncement 183 (overruled in 1938184), that federal courts were not bound
by state court decisions regarding "general common law". If Story's mind stopped
here, he could be regarded as safely tucked away in the classical mode of legal
formalism. But it does not stop. It proceeds to curious and exotic declarations of faith
in a morality above and beyond the formalist's sacred law and this brands it as that
hostile form of legal-mindedness I call lawyer-moralism--which requires a more
extended analysis.
2. An Analysis of the Term "Lawyer-Moralism"
I am persuaded by an analyst like Alisdair Maclntyre 185 that a shared sense of
community is indispensable to any plausible concept of morality. However, the
selection of a set of virtues calls for more than a prayerful insistence (uniting, as
Maclntyre points out, such thinkers as disparate as Kant, Kierkegaard, Hume and
Aristotle) upon truthfulness, justice, courage, promise-keeping and the like, and in
this we need to refer, not to some startlingly new and original insight, but to an old
one that may, by its very familiarity, have become too obvious. I am referring to the
idea, most dramatically exemplified by Hobbes, that morality is based upon, and
justified by, man's desire for survival. 8 6 H.L.A. Hart describes it this way:
...
it is the tacit assumption that the proper end of human activity is survival, and this
rests on the simple contingent fact that most men most of the time wish to continue
in existence. The actions which we speak of as those which are naturally good to do,
87
are those which are required for survival.
That reason, man's primary tool of survival, should displace survival itself as
the philosophical justification for morality, is readily understandable. "For virtue,"
says Cicero, "is reason completely developed.' '1 88 When reason fails to secure
immortality, the turn to faith or feeling also becomes understandable. The opposition to Hobbes, despite grudging admiration from philosophers, is, I suspect, due to
1 C.

WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 419 (1924).
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304(1816).
18341 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
B4 See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
"15
A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981).
8'

182 14

'1See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 183-201 (1981).
187 HART, supra note 41, at 187.
18 CIcERo, DE LEGIBUS 347 (C. Keyes trans. 1928).
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his limiting sense of the concept of survival. It is disagreeable to regard man as
someone marshalling all of his resources simply to preserve his animal existence. 18 9
But the singular contribution of Hobbes to moral inquiry was his taking into
account the dual aspects of man's mind, both reason and passion, and subordinating
them to his overriding instinct for survival. In so doing, he has had to walk the narrow
road between Aristotelian deification of reason on the one hand and Nietzsche's
glorification of the self-mastering will and G.E. Moore's of intuition on the other.
If we expand 9the sense of survival beyond physicality into the realm of MacIntyre's
"practices", ' it sits more comfortably in modem sensibilities. What we are
concerned with is not merely our physical survival but the survival of those
attachments (to village, country, baseball, physics, painting, law, liberty, justice,
etc.) one or more of us prizes perhaps more than life.
What then of emotivism and the possibility of infinite individual choices? We
consult Hobbes. There is no chance of the survival of any practice when it becomes
infinitely fragmented, except in a community of one. As Hobbes insists, survival
depends upon our making peace,' 9' and not only, I would add, with our bodies but
in those practices we can prize jointly. This we must do because we do not choose
to live as societies of one.
I suggest, then, that morality is that human element, lodged in reason, instinct
and will, that is concerned with the survival of man in his chosen practices. Particular
virtues are those manifestations of human behavior that have proved conducive to
particular survivals. The American legal mind, exclusive of the lawyer-moralist, is
itself a moral practice, predominantly concerned with preserving the priority (even
exclusivity) of legal-mindedness with (like the Enlightenment itself) its heavy
dependence upon reason, over any other of man's survival mechanisms, while the
lawyer-moralist prefers other moral practices based upon faith; an intuitive, emotive
sense of "right" and "wrong", natural over Constitutional rights.
3. Natural Law and Lawyer-Moralism
The "natural law" concept has blurred perceptions of the very existence of
lawyer-moralism as a continuing factor in Supreme Court legal-mindedness. John
Hart Ely, for example, relying upon a classical, Blackstonian definition ("dictated
by God himself"),192 concludes that "The idea [of natural law] is a discredited one
in our society, however, and for good reason ...It has thus become increasingly
evident that the only propositions with a prayer of passing themselves off as 'natural
law' are those so uselessly vague that no one will notice ...The concept has
189HOBBES, supra note 186.

'90
MACINTYRE, supra note 185.
191
HOBBES, supra note 186.

192ELY, supra note 18, at 48.
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consequently all but disappeared in American discourse." 193 While this death notice
may be true of the classical and Christian natural law schools (an announcement vigorously disputed by Peter J. Stanlis),194 it is difficult to dismiss summarily the
continuing influence of the "modem" natural law or "natural rights" tradition,
which surfaced in the seventeenth century with Hobbes, Hume, and Locke. This
tradition was eloquently distinguished by H.L.A. Hart from classical natural law:
the classical exponents [of natural law] ... conceived of survival., as

merely the lowest stratum in a much more complex and far more
debatable concept of the human end or good for man. Aristotle included
it in the disinterested cultivation of the human intellect, and Aquinas the
knowledge of God... Yet other thinkers, Hobbes and Hume among
them, have been willing to lower their sights; they have seen in the
modest aim of survival the central indisputable element which gives
empirical good sense to the terminology of Natural Law....
This simple thought has in fact very much to do with the characteristics
of both law and morals, and it can be disentangled from the more
disputable parts of the general teleological outlook in which the end or
good for man appears as a specific way of life about which, in fact, men
may profoundly disagree. Moreover, we can, in referring to survival,
discard, as too metaphysical for modem minds, the notion that this is
something antecedently fixed which men necessarily desire because it
is their proper goal or end.., it is not merely that an overwhelming
majority of men do wish to live, even at the cost of hideous misery, but
this is reflected in whole structures of our thought and language, in terms
95
of which we describe the world and each other.
Archibald Cox would make a fundamental Supreme Court division between "belief
in the supremacy of natural law:.rnd its survival into our own time" and "the
logically inconsistent conviction.. : that the people, expressing themselves through
the majority, have the right to work their will.' '" 96 And Robert H. Bork, a lawyermoralist who masquerades as a formalist 197 and a rule-skeptic' 9 believes that
"Neuhaus is entirely correct in saying 'human behavior is stubbornly entangled with
beliefs about right and wrong. Law that is recognized as legitimate is therefore
related to--even organically related to, if you199will--the larger universe of moral
discourse that helps shape human behavior.'
'9

Id. at 50-52.

194P. STANLIS, EDMUND BURKE AND THE NATURAL LAW (1958).

195HART, supra note 41, at 187-88.
196A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 32 (1976).
19? "[Tlhe framers' intentions with respect to freedoms are the sole legitimate premise from which

constitutional analysis may proceed." R. BORK, TRADmON AND MORALITY INCONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11 (1984).
91"[Tihe moral content of the law must [never] be given by the morality of the judge." Id. at 11.
199Id. at 11.
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4. Lawyer-Moralist Justice Joseph Story
Much of Justice Story's judgment was based on unabashed "moral" precepts
that from time to time jostled his dearly cherished common law. He held on circuit
in La Jeune Eugenie200 that the slave trade was contrary to the law of nations on the
ground it "was a breach of all the moral duties, of all the maxims of justice, mercy
and humanity." 20 ' Yet his ruling was "in direct conflict with established international law, and with several decisions of the English Courts." 20 2 Indeed, when the
question came up again several years later, this time in the Supreme Court,2 3 it was
the opinion of Justice Marshall, the formalist, that "whatever might be the answer
2°4
of a moralist", international law did not consider the slave trade piracy.
And Justice Story would say of the Cherokee cases of 183 1205 and 1832206 that
the subject touched "the moral sense of all New England.'' 20 7 Justice Marshall,
arguing lack of Supreme Court jurisdiction because the Indians were not a foreign
nation, permitted the State of Georgia to assert sovereignty over Indian lands in
Georgia even though these lands were the subject of Federal treaties. "If the
Courts," Marshall could not resist adding, "were permitted to indulge their
20 8
sympathies, a case better calculated to excite them can scarcely be imagined."
Story had no trouble at all in indulging his sympathies and dissented.
The Cherokee Nation cases are interesting in a number of respects. They
suggest that the New England conscience encompassed a far more general terrain
than black slavery, that the Constitution was highly vulnerable to the notion of
nullification, and, finally, that Story had to disagree with Marshall when the moral
element of a case became sufficiently intense. A line, clear in the context of the
shifting, ambiguous demarcations that divide legal thinking, separates the moralism
of Story (which embraces premises ultimately grounded in concepts of'"natural" or
"moral" law) from the formalism of Marslial which resists them in favor of an
indigenous Constitution.
5. Lawyer-Moralist Chief Justice Earl Warren
The pre-eminent example of a lawyer-moralist is, of course, Chief Justice Earl

o United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 Fed. Cas. (2 Mason 409) 832 (1822).
Ild. at 845. See J. McCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMiucAN CoNSTIUTIoN, 65,297-98 (1971). Cf. R.

20

NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY:

STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIc 347-50 (1985).

"12 WARREN, supra note 181, at 45.
213The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
204 Id. at 121.
The Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
11 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
2072 WARREN, supra note 181, at 210.
21 The CherokeeNation, 30 U.S. at 15 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
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Warren. Alexander Bickel offers a telling observation:
The assault upon the legal order by moral imperatives was not only or
perhaps even most effectively an assault from the outside. As I have
suggested, it came as well from within, in the Supreme Court headed for
fifteen years by Earl Warren. When a lawyer stood before [Warren] arguing his side of a case on the basis of some legal doctrine or other..
. the chief justice would shake him off saying, "Yes, yes, yes, but is it
•.. right? Is it good?" ... The Warren Court took the greatest pride in

cutting through legal technicalities...

2 09

And Anthony Lewis gravely concludes, "Earl Warren was the closest thing the
United States has had to a Platonic Guardian, dispensing law from a throne without
any sensed limits of power except what was seen as the good of society. Fortunately
he was a humane, honorable, democratic Guardian. .. 21
Bickel describes Warren's Court as "in its heyday .. .Hugo Black write

large. ' 211 This conclusion is presumably based upon Bickel's preceding conclusions that" [M]ost of life is seen in moral rather than prudential terms. None of the
pragmatic skepticism so salient in the Whig model infects the Constitution of the
Black's Constitution, a storehouse of princontractarian. This was Justice Hugo
212
ciples, inflexible and numerous."
The problem with conflating Justice Black and the Warren Court is that they
simply will not accommodate each other. While Black's primer admittedly was the
United States Constitution (and, more particularly, the collection of commandments
known as the first eight Amendments), it hardly takes a leap of the imagination to
regard the Warren Court as guided by persuasions that might, in any given instance,
supersede the American "storehouse of principles", whether derived from Justice
Black's Constitution or, in an earlier tradition, the English common law. The
lumping of Black and Warren has a debilitating effect on Bickel's overriding
argument (an apologia for the court lives and minds of Justices Holmes and
Frankfurter) in favor of the rule-skeptical branch of the legal mind, for it fails to give
at least some credit to formalism for honoring the rule of reason and thereby
preserving the life of the legal mind as much as rule-skepticism. Rule-skepticism
and formalism are united in their impatience with feeling states as criteria for legal
judgments and with the rejection of legal-mindedness by lawyer-moralism for the
sake of a "higher" morality of judicial decision-making. Without too much strain,
Warren evokes memories of that nineteenth century New Hampshire judge who said,
"It is our duty to do justice between parties; not by any quirk out of Coke and
209Bickel, supra note 49, at 120-21.

A. Lewis, EarlWarren, in THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
OPINIONS 2726-27. (L. Friedman & F. Israel ed. 1969).
212 BICKEL, supra note 49, at 9.
212Id. at 8.
2,04
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Blackstone--books that I never read and never will." 213 A lawyer-moralist such as
Warren, to put it bluntly, retains the trappings of his legal training only to cover his
moral tracks. He may masquerade, quite successfully, as a formalist, since, after all,
the Bill of Rights is a frozen slice of "natural rights".
Impediments to those who seek to categorize Chief Justice Warren 21 4 arise
from the paradox that while Warren refused, in classical rule-skeptical tradition, to
recognize the necessary validity of pre-existing legal rules, he substituted, in the
formalistic mode but completely alien to it, a set of ethical commandments
("fighting faiths' "),215 the antithesis of rule-skepticism. Unlike the formalists and
rule-skeptics, who are willing to sacrifice anything else to preserve the Law, the
lawyer-moralist might very well jettison even the Law to save his intuitive, ethical
commandments, euphemized under the label of "the right". This creates doubt that
Warren was "result-oriented", a familiar accusation. Confusion arises from the
thwarted normal expectation of a result evolving from legal precedents or, in any
event, the Law's preservation. It is assumed there is no guiding premise at all. As
G. Edward White suggests, Warren's results flowed indifferently over the Law from
2 16
his ethical premises.
For Chief Justice Warren, any human life worth living depended upon the
survival of the practice of righteousness, upon faith in such ethical standards as
common decency and fairness and equality, and upon a society's ability to apply
them. Frankfurter is at his patronizing worst when he labels Warren "undisciplined
by adequate professional learning and cultivated understanding.' '217 Yet it is underto
standably difficult for Frankfurter to attribute any significant judicial value 218
Warren's "commitments to decency, fairness, equality, integrity, and honesty.'
If the Supreme Court is conceded to be, as it generally is, the citadel of reason filtered
through a doctrinal integrity of reasoning,2 19 there is justification in Frankfurter's
antagonism to the substitution of ethically-inspired commandments.
Meanwhile, Justice Black, the formalist, divorces himself from the suggestion
that the Warren Court is himself "writ large" in a typical dissenting opinion. The
case is Griswold v. Connecticut,22 decided in 1965 (Frankfurter had left the Court
in 1962), in which Warren joined Douglas and the majority in a perfect example of
an ethical imperative created from whole cloth. Douglas manufactured his famous
conceit that the First Amendment had "a penumbra where privacy is protected from
governmental intrusion", 221 a gray area introduced into First Amendment interpre106 (1965).
214See A. Lewis, Revolutionary Justice, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1982, 7, at 1, col. 2 (city ed.).
215Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
21 6
See G. WHITE, EARL WARREN, A PuBLIC LIFE 229, 358-67 (1982).
237Lewis, supra note 214.
213p. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA

2

1 Gressman, "As Chief Chancellor" 60 A.B.A.J. 1228, 1229 (1974).

239WHITE, EARL WARREN, supra note 216, at 219.

220 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.
22,
id. at 483.
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tation that offended Black deeply. The idea that, through emanations, protection
from invasion of privacy became a First Amendment fiat, so provoked Black that he
222
fingered the hidden, unmentionable pulse of the Supreme Court--Platonism.
Black was impelled also to reject the concurring majority views of Justices Harlan
and White and what he considered their astonishingly naked and inexcusable
profession of Supreme Court power, purportedly validated by "natural justice' '.223
While both lawyer-moralists and rule-skeptics have no hesitation in leapfrogging the Constitution, their purposes have nothing in common. Ethical considerations of Warren may almost casually transcend the national interest while Frankfurter inevitably must wave his flag.
From the vantage point of a liberal, Justice Black, for a so-called First
Amendment absolutist, seems curiously constrained in some of his decisions,
especially when Justices Warren and Douglas, free as birds, are to be found on the
other side. The constraint, of course, is Black's formalism that insists upon adhering
to his "storehouse of principles" without expanding or elaborating them to suit the
22 5
a student
occasion. Whether it is the 1964 Bell224 sit-in case orAdderley v. Florida,
22 6
demonstration on jail grounds, or the Amalgamated Food case of 1968 involving
picketing of a shopping center, or the library sit-in case of 1966, Brown v.
Louisiana' 2 7 Black, intransigent on First Amendment rights as he reads them,
refuses nevertheless to mount a promiscuous invasion of public property rights. He
rejects the idea that "groups that think they have been mistreated or that have
actually been mistreated have a constitutional right to use the public's streets,
buildings, and property to protest whatever, wherever, whenever they want, without
regard to whom such conduct may disturb."28 Warren and Douglas have no trouble
finding the "whenever" and "however" to be implicit in the First Amendment to
prevent "the custodian of the public property in his discretion (from deciding) when
public places shall be used for the communication of ideas ...For to place such
discretion in any public official.., is to place those who assert their First Amendment
2 29
rights at his mercy."
Chief Justice Warren's lawyer-moralism is fine-tuned in a 1964 pronouncement: "[W]eighting the votes of citizens differently, by any method or means,
merely because of where they happen to reside, hardly seems justifiable." 30 Given
nothing else, given a situation of first instance, given no history of Supreme Court
treatment of the question, Warren's conclusion that each person is entitled to a vote
222Id. at 526-27.
22
1 d.at 511-13.
224Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
225Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
226Amalgamated Food Employees Union, Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
dissenting).
22' Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (Black, J.,
22
1 Id. at 162.
2 Adderly, 385 U.S. at 54.
220Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964).
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of equal weight seems not only eminently fair but a logical application of the equal
protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, Justice Harlan did
not think so:
These decisions give support to a current mistaken view of the
Constitution and the constitutional function of this Court. This view, in
a nutshell, is that every major social ill in this country can find its cure
in some constitutional "principle" and that this Court should "take the
lead" in promoting reform when other branches of government fail to
2 31
act.
Warren represents, to most lawyers and their fellow-travelers, whether they
admire his results or not, a direct threat to the validity of Supreme Court Justices
acting as "guardians of wisdom" in our society. To them, wisdom is the negating
of even the suspicion of arbitrary or intuitive or whimsical judgment unanchored by
consultation with the combined intelligences and experiences of prior legal minds.
Justice Douglas, after Chief Justice Warren's death on July 9, 1974, praises
Warren for his integrity, for his devotion to the "little person", and then makes this
curiously tangential statement:
I do know that the Republican Convention in 1948 was a great
disappointment to him. I do believe that a Warren-Dewey ticket would
have beaten Truman. I do know that Earl Warren went to Chicago with
considerable influence and expectations. He was undone; and some of
the things done to him were inexplicable. But never would he talk about
it. He carried no grudge. He was a man without grudge. He stood high
232
above the crowd.
Earl Warren, however "high above the crowd", never made it to his
mountain, the White House, but he did make the White House come to him. In the
final analysis, he was less a Chief Justice than a President presiding over Madison's
pet lost cause, a Council of Revision. His special brand of legal-mindedness, a
dispute with the rule of reason itself, presents a serious threat to the special grace and
inviolability of the Supreme Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is tempting in the struggle between Supreme Court rule-skepticism and
formalism to come down on one side or the other. Yet upon reflection, given a Court
containing, for example, a Justice Frankfurter and a Justice Black, one should not

2332

Id. at 624.

1 W. 0. Douglas, J., As Chief Justice,60 A.B.A.J. 1232, 1234 (1974).
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a denial of Constitutional absolutes, became increasingly distasteful to liberals as he
was driven to prefer legislative judgments over those of the Founding Fathers in any
contest between national interests and personal rights, it operated at the same time
to remind one how intransigent a completely formalistic court might be. We need
only to propel Frankfurter onto the Court in the 1930's to realize what a darling of
the liberals he might have remained if he had arrived during the New Deal years. The
history of the United States Supreme Court vividly exemplifies H.L.A. Hart's
observation that formalism and rule-skepticism are "[the Scylla and Charybdis of
juristic theory; they are great exaggerations, salutary when they correct each other,
and the truth lies between them.' '233
It was important for the Court in its humble origins, when it had to struggle to
assert both its independence and its value, to have a marshalling force to crystallize
its values and unify its strength. It was necessary for Chief Justice Marshall to
submerge internal discordances and to present a single voice to the public at large as
the voice of the Court. But with his success at validating the Court and his triumph
in asserting judicial supremacy, it became important to allow the Justices not only
to argue privately among themselves but to bring their dialectical struggles into the
visible Supreme Court law, for the dialectic itself fashions the ultimate strength of
the Court and, at the same time and perhaps even more importantly, creates a selfregulating restraint upon arbitrary and capricious exercises of power. The tension
between the formalistic and rule-skeptical views--the constantly reshuffled majority
and minority opinions preserve and expand the vitality of the Court. Without the
differing views of reasonable men, the Supreme Court would seem to have as little
chance of surviving as the democratic body politic itself.
This, however, is not to invite into the dialectic that aberrant form I have
termed "lawyer-moralism". It is, simply, too disruptive in its antagonism to the
supremacy of judicial law which is the most vital premise shared by formalists and
rule-skeptics. For the nature of morality tells us a great deal about the nature of
judicial law. Morality viewed as the preference in each case for a given practice
informs us that the difficulty in fusing the concepts of morality and judicial law lies
not only in the confidence of judges that judicial law is the only morality (for this is
a confidence shared by any preferred practice) but in the general American
recognition that judicial law is the preferred practice. We are not under man, but
under God and law. The Constitution,not a clutch of "natural" moralities, is what
the Supreme Court says it is. The placing of judicial law, a morality among
moralities, in a position of preeminent American power seems to oppose it to
morality itself. The problem is compounded by the equation of law with reason. This
inevitably encourages a contrasting coupling of feelings and instincts with a "true"
morality.
The greatest fear entertained by most Americans in regard to the Supreme
233HART, supra note 41, at 144.
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Court, most virulent at times of presidential elections, is that the Justices, appointed
by a politician, the President, will be politically motivated. But the history of the
Court, as Charles Warren points out in a discussion of Justice Story, has indicated
otherwise: "In Story's case, as in so many instances in the history of the Court, there
was shown the utter futility of the expectations, frequently entertained by politicians,
that the judicial decisions of a Judge would accord with his politics at the time of
appointment to the Supreme Bench.' '234 And Anthony Lewis says of the Burger
Court, with its six new Republican Justices:
When Warren E. Burger succeeded Earl Warren as chief justice of the
United States in 1969, many expected to see the more striking constitutional doctrines of the Warren years rolled back or even abandoned..
..And what has happened to those controversial Warren Court doctrines? They are more securely rooted now than they were in 1969,
accepted by the Burger Court as the premises of constitutional decisionmaking in those areas.235
This resistance to partisan motives on the part of Justices is, of course, salutary.
It speaks of a devotion to the purpose which the Court was designed to perpetuate-the rule of reason, rather than of topical passions. Such a devotion would appear to
be natural to the formalists and rule-skeptics who have generally guided the Court.
It is just as apparent that even more inappropriate and possibly even more dangerous
than the rule of a transitory political passion on the Supreme Court is the persistent
ethical code of the lawyer-moralist.
Finally, it is noteworthy that in the many instances where these conflicts are
not starkly presented, it has been possible for the Supreme Court to relax into a not
necessarily desirable unanimity or near unanimity. In these instances it is possible
for the formalists to regard the pre-existing rule as sufficiently ambiguous and
therefore alterable, for the rule-skeptics to consider the consequences of adhering to
a premise as too trivial (immaterial) to merit a fuss, for the moralists to find in a
premise based on reason a sufficient core of moral faith.

234 1 WARREN, supra

note 181, at 420.

235A. Lewis, Forwardto The Burger Court: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T at vii (V. Blasi ed.

1983).
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